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Doe v. Human
Doe v. Human was a 1989 federal court case involving a challenge to the Gravette (Benton County) school district’s policy for facilitating Bible learning for its elementary school students. It had its roots in the enactment of Arkansas’s Act 1 of 1930, legislation that required every publicly supported school up through high school to “provide for the reverent daily reading of a portion of the English [B]ible without comment,” and “prayer may be offered.”
According to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Arkansas’s factual summary, the Gravette School District had faithfully satisfied this directive “[f]or longer than anyone can reliably remember.” It had not been a controversial policy. The schools allowed students whose parents did not want their children to have the Bible instruction to engage in tutoring sessions or other instructional activities, although the court noted that ninety-six percent of students attended the Bible classes.
However, U.S. Supreme Court decisions were raising the question of the constitutionality of the long-ago enacted statute, and in 1989, the parents of one child filed suit, asserting that the school district policy was a violation of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The parents also sought a preliminary injunction.
Litigation followed, with the family claiming that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1948 ruling in McCullom v. Board of Education was “directly on point,” and furthermore, that under the Court’s 1971 ruling in Lemon v. Kurtzman, the practices of the school district were unconstitutional. In response, the Gravette School District maintained that not only could the case be distinguished from McCullom, but also that its policies were constitutional under Lemon and that the “equal access” doctrine of Widmar v. Vincent, decided by the Court in 1981, permitted privately conducted programs like that in Gravette.
Generations of Gravette students fondly remembered “Bible story time,” considering it an enjoyable break from the rigors of math, science, and other academic subjects. Given that it was a standard part of the day, it was not generally perceived so much as a class or religious instruction but rather as story time with music and games. Also, the teachers were not faculty members but were instead outside volunteers who believed in the importance of Bible instruction. As one volunteer put it, she taught the Bible stories for the students’ “moral and ethical values, to make children better citizens.” At the same time, a school administrator testified that the instruction “was not religious,” but rather “sectarian,” adding that the “Bible readings were meant to help [students] determine their value system and become better persons.” The apparent connection between creating good citizens and teaching the Christian Bible was not without its unspoken messages, however.
In addition, given the generally positive perceptions of the endeavor, the opt-out provision, while readily available, could seem almost punitive, as those whose parents chose not to have them participate would generally find themselves having to report to the school office or the library, where they could do homework or study. It was a decision, especially for the younger students, that often left them open to ridicule or being ostracized by their peers.
This reality was overlooked by many in the community, and as the litigation moved forward, people expressed surprise that the plaintiffs opted to be anonymous, using “Doe” in the case name. However, the hateful comments and messages received by attorney Jim Lingle, who represented the Doe family, helped explain why. The “Human” in the case title was Paul Dee Human, superintendent of the Gravette Public School District.
The case came before the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Arkansas for an initial hearing on August 3, 1989. At that time, Gravette officials argued that “the practices were constitutional because they were nondenominational, were secular in nature and were voluntary.” In response, Lingle argued that the program was unconstitutional under both McCullum and Lemon. After hearing the first round of arguments, Judge Morris Sheppard Arnold concluded that it “would hardly seem…that a plainer case of establishment under the McCullum rule could come before the court.” But he also noted that the more recent Lemon ruling offered a “more refined set of potentially applicable principles” and thus also deserved consideration. In looking at the Gravette program in the context of the rules established in both McCullum as well as Lemon, the court observed that “the Gravette school system is entangled with this religious instruction to a prohibited degree…[since] the instruction takes place during regular school hours on school property. In impressionable young minds it must surely seem that the Bible classes are part of the regular curriculum and endorsed by the school. Indeed, an adult mind could easily come to the same conclusion.” Consequently, the court issued a preliminary injunction ordering the Gravette Schools District and its officials “to cease its present practice with respect to Bible instruction.” At the same time, it acceded to the school district’s request for a full hearing, which it scheduled for November 3.
While the district essentially reaffirmed its original arguments in November, the fuller treatment and the extended testimony did not convince Judge Arnold, who concluded that the situation in McCullum was, the school district’s assertions that it could be distinguished notwithstanding, wholly on point. In McCullum, the Court was presented with a situation where “a school system created a program in which Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish instructors came into public schools and held classes during school hours.” Although the program was purely voluntary, the Court held that the program unconstitutionally aided religion, because “[p]upils compelled by law to go to school for secular education are released in part from their legal duty upon the condition that they attend the religious classes.”
Gravette’s second argument that McCullum had been modified by Lemon in a way that made its practice acceptable was no more persuasive. Arnold first noted: “Under Lemon, any government involvement with religion, to be constitutional, must have a secular purpose, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and it must not foster an excessive governmental entanglement with religion.” He then pointed to specifics of the Gravette program that raised “a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the primary purpose of Gravette’s program is religious or secular.” He added, “Even if the defendants’ program has a primarily secular purpose, it is still unconstitutional if the principal effect of the courses is either to advance or inhibit religion. The Gravette Bible classes are plainly not wholly secular in character.”
In a final plea, the school district sought support in Zorach v. Clauson, a 1952 U.S. Supreme Court decision that had allowed for Bible instruction during school hours that occurred off campus. Judge Arnold quickly dispatched of that argument, noting that it was simply not on point in connection with Gravette’s on-campus, in-school program. In conclusion, the federal district court ruled that the “defendants’ program unconstitutionally advances religion” and made its preliminary injunction permanent.
The court’s decision, announced in the local Gravette News Herald with the headline “Story Time Ruled Illegal,” was not readily accepted by the local community, and a campaign was immediately begun to raise funds to support an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. In the meantime, an off-campus alternative, housed in a privately funded trailer, was launched just weeks after the court’s ruling. The school board was reported to have sent out 500 petitions seeking a parent signature to allow their children to attend the Bible classes; only 250 were returned, however, a significant drop from the historic participation of more than ninety percent.
But when, in March 1991, the school district got word that the U.S. Supreme Court would not hear any appeal, those still fighting turned their energies to moving the trailer-based program into a chapel built by local citizens, and while the arrangement appeared to still violate the law, Lingle said his client would not fight it. The program, in fact, continued albeit under the changed circumstances, illustrating a reality of judicial enforcement, and proving, as one author put it, that “a government could not enforce the Constitution easily when it is not in line with what the majority desire.”
A bill introduced in the Arkansas General Assembly in 2025 by state representative Brit McKenzie of Rogers (Benton County) brought the matter of religious study during the school day back to the fore. House Bill 1139, titled “The Released Time Education Act,” would require the state’s public and charter schools to allow their students leave campus for up to five hours each week to receive “religious moral instruction” if their parents request it.
For additional information:
Doe v. Human, 725 F. Supp. 1499 (W.D. Ark. 1989).
“Doe v. Human, 725 F. Supp. 1503 (W.D. Ark. 1989).” Justia.com. https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/725/1503/1406841/ (accessed January 28, 2025).
Released Time Religious Education. https://www.releasedtime.org/arkansas (accessed January 28, 2025).
Roe, Afsaneh N. “Doe v. Human: The Establishment Clause and Bible Story Time.” In First Amendment Studies in Arkansas: The Richard S. Arnold Prize Essays, edited by Stephen A. Smith. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2016.
William H. Pruden III
Ravenscroft School
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